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ESTABLISHING BREACH OF SECTION
3 OF THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
THE INDIAN BID RIGGING CASES
-John

Handoll1

I. INTRODUCTION
A significant percentage of Indian GDP is devoted to public spending on
goods and services. 2 It is clearly important that public contracts should be contested for and won on the basis of competitive bidding, enabling the procuring
body to get the lowest price/best value for money.
Bid rigging is as "a particularform of collusive price-fixing behaviour by
which firms coordinate their bids on procurement or project contracts."3 This
skews the tendering process and, by denying the procuring body the benefits of
competition, can result in significant financial (and even social) harm. Bid rigging takes many forms, including identical pricing, cover bidding4, bid rotation,
bid suppression, market allocation and collective boycotts.'
Effective competition law and enforcement are critical weapons in the public procurement armoury. 6 Competition law should set out the framework for
establishing breach, taking into account the serious nature of bid rigging and
the often secretive nature of such activity. The relevant competition authorities
should enforce the law. In this regard, the rule of law should be followed: the
2
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A recent report by UNODC suggests that public procurement spending accounts for between
20% and 30% of GDP, and that it accounts for more than 50% of the spending of several
Government ministries. See UNODC, India: Probity in Public Procurement, 11 (2013), available
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at http://www.unodc.org/documents/southasia/publications/research-studies/India-PPPs.pdf.
OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, available at http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.
asp?JD=3334.
Also called "complementary", "courtesy", "token" or "symbolic" bidding.
See OECD, Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2009), available at

http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/42851044.pdf.
6

See OECD, Recommendation on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2012), available

at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competitionloecdrecommendationonfightingbidrigginginpublicprocurement.htm.

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

27 NLSI REv. (2015)

starting point is, and has to be, that enterprises and individuals are innocent of
any breach unless and until it is proved otherwise. The question, of course, is
how it is to be 'proved otherwise' and, as will be seen below, the dice are to
some extent loaded against those suspected of bid rigging.
This article considers how breach of Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002
("Act") has been established by the Competition Commission of India ("CCI") in
7
the eleven bid rigging cases decided up to July 2015.
II. THE COMPETITION ACT, 2002
India's competition law rules are contained in the Act and Regulations made
thereunder. The relevant provisions of the Act entered into force in May 2009.
The CCI is responsible for enforcement: the Director General ("DG") assists
the CCI in investigating prima facie cases of infringement, reporting on his/
her findings to the CCI, which will then take the appropriate action. Appeals
may be made against certain directions, decisions and orders of the CCI to the
Competition Appellate Tribunal (the "COMPAT"). From there, an appeal may be
made to the Supreme Court of India.
Section 3(1) of the Act prohibits individual enterprises or persons, and associations of enterprises, from entering into any agreement in relation to goods or
services which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition ("AAEC") in India.
An AAEC is not defined in terms. However, Section 19(3) of the Act lists the
six factors to which the CCI is to have due regard while determining whether
an agreement has an AAEC: (a) creation of barriers to new entrants in the market; (b) driving existing competitors out of the market; (c) foreclosure of competition by hindering entry into the market; (d) accrual of benefits to consumers; (e)
improvements in production or distribution of goods or provision of services; and
(f) promotion of technical, scientific and economic development by means of production or distribution of goods or provision of services.
Section 3(3) of the Act provides for a presumption of an AAEC in the case
of four types of agreements, and other practices or decisions, including cartels,
involving persons engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or provision of
services. In terms, this provision, which places the burden to rebut the presumption on the parties concerned, covers agreements which
(a) directly or indirectly determine purchase or sale prices;
7
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(b) limit or control production, supply, markets, technical development,
investment or the provision of services;
(c) share the market or source of production or provision of services by way
of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of goods or services,
or number of customers in the market or any similar way; or
(d) directly or indirectly results in bid rigging or collusive bidding
'Bid rigging' is defined in the Explanation to Section 3(3) of the Act as "any
agreement, between the enterprises or persons referred to in sub-section (3)
engaged in identical or similar production or trading of goods or provision of
services, which has the effect of eliminating or reducing competition for bids or
adversely affecting or manipulating the process for bidding."
It should be noted that a 'bid rigging' case may involve activities other than
bid rigging as defined. Indeed, in many of the bid rigging cases discussed here,
the CCI has established agreements covered by Section 3(3)(a), (b) and(c), as well
as (d).
Where breach has been established by the CCI, Section 27 of the Act empowers it to take one or more steps. It may issue a 'cease and desist' order, impose
financial penalties on the parties, direct that the agreements stand modified,
direct the enterprises concerned to abide by such other orders as it may pass and
comply with directions (including payment of costs) if any, or pass "such other
order or issue such directions as it may deem fit."
As regards financial penalties, Section 27(b) of the Act enables the CCI to
impose a penalty of up to ten per cent of the average of the turnover for the last
three preceding financial years. However, for an agreement entered into by a cartel, the CCI may impose on each person involved in the cartel, a penalty of up to
three times of its profit, or ten per cent of its turnover for each year of continuance of the agreement, whichever figure is greater. It should be noted that in all
the bid rigging cases decided to date where it decided to impose penalties, the
CCI opted for the 'standard' penalties based on up to 10% of average turnover for
the last three years, even though it clearly regarded bid rigging as cartelisation.
Once breach by a company has been established, individuals may themselves
be liable under Section 48 of the Act. A person in charge of and responsible to
the company for the conduct of its business shall, unless it can be proved he/
she was unaware of the breach or had exercised all due diligence to prevent it,
be deemed to be guilty and punished accordingly. Individual directors, managers, secretaries or other officers will also be deemed liable where breach has
taken place with their consent or connivance, or is attributable to their neglect.
Individual liability was not established in the earlier bid-rigging cases reviewed
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here. However, in two recent cases8 , the CCI stated that the liability of persons in
charge of the relevant businesses at the time of contravention was the subject of
separate proceedings which had yet to be completed, and this aspect is likely to
feature in more such cases in the future.

III. THE INDIAN BID RIGGING CASES
To date (August 2015), the CCI has established bid rigging in eleven cases,9
covering identical/near-identical pricing", cover bidding", market allocation 2 , and
collective boycotts 3 Appeals have been decided by the Competition Appellate
Tribunal ("COMPAT") in five of these cases. 4 In one case, the COMPAT referred
the question of penalties back to the CCI: the CCI made an order on this issue,
Bio-Med (P)Ltd., In re, 2015 SCC OnLine CCI 91 : 2015 Comp LR 649 (CCI). See also Sheth &
Co. (Bomb Containers),In re, 2015 SCC OnLine CCI 95 :2015 Comp LR 715 (CCI).
9

The CCI orders, in chronological order, are:

(1) Suo motu case against LPG Cylinder Manufacturers, In re (LPG Cylinder Manufacturers),
2012 SCC OnLine CCI 12 : 2012 Comp LR 197 (CCI).
(2) Coal India Ltd. v. Gulf Oil Corpn. Ltd. (Explosives), 2012 SCC OnLine CCI 21 : 2012 Comp
LR 1 (CCI).
(3) A Foundation for Common Cause & People Awareness v. PES Installations (P) Ltd.
(SafdarjungHospital), 2012 CCI 22 SCC OnLine: 2012 Comp LR 588 (CCI).
(4) Aluminium Phosphide Tablets Manufacturers (Aluminium Phosphide), In re, 2012 SCC
OnLine CCI 25 : 2012 Comp LR 753 (CCI).
(5) Gulshan Verma v. Union of India, 2012 SCC OnLine CCI 30 : 2012 Comp LR 812 (CCI).
(6) B.P. Khare v. Orissa Concrete & Allied Industries Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine CCI 21 : (2013)
114 CLA 280 (CCI).
(7) Director General (Supplies & Disposals) v. Puja Enterprises (Rubber Soles), 2013 SCC
OnLine CCI 55 : (2013) 116 CLA 126 (CCI).
(8) Diesel Loco Modernization Works, In re (Feed valves), 2014 SCC OnLine CCI 16 : 2014
Comp LR 170 (CCI).
(9) Vaccines
"
(10) Bomb Containers. 'lus factors"lelism where
of "hese best practices as inappropriate. ndations for reform, and it is wholly incorrect on the par
(11) Cartelisationby public sector insurance companies in rigging the bids submitted in response
to the tenders floated by the Government of Keralafor selecting insurance service provider
for Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojna, In re (Public Sector Insurance Companies), 2015 SCC
OnLine CCI 192.
10 See LPG Cylinder Manufacturers,Aluminium Phosphide, South Eastern Railways, Rubber Soles,
Feed Valves and Bomb Containers.
See Safdarjung Hospital, Jai Prakash Narain, Feed Valves and Vaccines.
12 See LPG Cylinder Manufacturers, South Eastern Railway, Rubber Soles, Vaccines and Public
Sector Insurance Companies.
13 See Explosives and Aluminium Phosphide.
14 The COMPAT orders are, in chronological order:
(1) MDD Medical Systems India (P) Ltd., In re (Safdarjung HospitalAppeal), 2013 SCC OnLine
Comp AT 56 : 2013 Comp LR 327 (Comp AT).
(2) MDD Medical Systems India (P) Ltd., In re (Jai Prakash Narain Appeal), 2013 SCC OnLine
Comp AT 75.
(3) Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd., In re (Explosives Appeal),2013 SCC OnLine Comp AT 132
(2013) 114 CLA 25 (CAT).
(4) Excel Crop Care Ltd., In re (Aluminium Phosphide Appeal), 2013 SCC OnLine Comp AT 149
:2013 Comp LR 799 (Comp AT). This is on further appeal to the Supreme Court.
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which has now been appealed to the COMPAT.15 Three cases have been appealed
to the Supreme Court of India, with final judgement pending in all. 6 An appeal
7
is also pending before the COMPAT in one other case.'
IV. FACILITATING ENFORCEMENT
A number of features of the Act have facilitated enforcement.
First, once bid rigging is established, an AAEC is presumed, with the burden
of proving otherwise shifting to the parties concerned. In a number of cases, the
CCI considered arguments seeking to rebut the presumption. 8 In some earlier
cases, the CCI, perhaps showing an abundance of caution, conducted an AAEC
analysis even though the opposite parties raised no arguments in this regard. 9 In
the Public Sector Insurance Companies case, the CCI simply stated the presumption."° In the Vaccines case"', the issue was not addressed in such terms at all.
Second, as penalties are administrative rather than criminal, the CCI applies a
lower standard of proof than that of 'beyond reasonable doubt' required in criminal cases. The description of this lower burden of proof has varied. The CCI at
first stated that the standard was a "balance of probability" and "liaison of inten23
tion."22 It has later held that the test is a "preponderanceof probabilities."
The
COMPAT has held that the test of a "strong probability" would suffice, but that
its application would differ from case to case, with unlikely or particularly serious events requiring more convincing proof.24
Third, the term "agreement" is broadly defined in Section 2(b) of the Act to
include "any agreement or understanding or action in concert," whether or not
it is formal, in writing or legally enforceable. The CCI has endorsed2 5 the oft-re26
peated statement of Lord Denning that "a nod or a wink will do."
(5) International Cylinder (P) Ltd., In re (LPG Cylinder Manufacturers Appeal), 2012 SCC

OnLine Comp AT 195 :2012 Comp LR 1116 (Comp AT).

15

Suo motu case against LPG Cylinder Manufacturers, In re, 2012 SCC OnLine CCI 12 ; LPG
Cylinder Manufacturers Appeal (No. 2) (Appeals Nos. 64-67 and 71-72 of 2014, and 1-7, 17-19,

21-38 and 42-43 of 2015) (heard but not decided at the time of writing).
16

See Explosives Appeal, LPG Cylinder Manufacturers Appeal and Aluminium PhosphideAppeal.

18

Stone IndiaLtd., In re (Feed Valves Appeal), Appeal No.20 of 2014 (Comp AT).
See Rubber Soles at 44, Feed Valves at 52, and Bomb Containers at 40.

19 LPG Cylinder Manufacturers 14.5, 14.66. See also LPG Cylinder Manufacturers Appeal at

44,

38; Aluminium Phosphide 7.32-7.43; and South Eastern Railway at 36-38).
20 Public Sector Insurance Companies at 61.
21 Vaccines.
LPG Cylinder Manufacturers at 14.65.
3 Aluminium Phosphide at 7.29, South Eastern Railway at 32, Rubber Soles at 25, Feed Valves
at 32, Bomb Containers at 34.
14 LPG Cylinder ManufacturersAppeal at 30, 31.
25 LPG Cylinder Manufacturers at 14.9
26 Registrar of Restrictive Trading Agreements v. W H. Smith & Son Ltd., (1969) 1 WLR 1460

(CA).
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Finally, given the often secretive nature of bid rigging and the difficulty of
obtaining direct evidence of wrongdoing, the CCI can look for and rely on circumstantial evidence of bid rigging.2 7 The CCI has made it clear that the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement can be inferred from the
conduct of the colluding parties. 28 In a formulation employed in a number of
the more recent cases, "the existence of an anti-competitive practice or agreement must be inferredfrom a number of coincidences and indicia which, taken
together, may, in the absence of another plausible explanation, constitute evi29
dence of the existence of an agreement.
V. EVIDENCE OF BREACH
The evidence that may be used to arrive at a finding of breach will, of course,
vary depending on the circumstances of each case and on the type of bid rigging.
An attempt is made below to distinguish between different types of bid rigging
and to look at the way the CCI (and the COMPAT) has sought to establish breach
for each.
A. Identical pricing
In relation to identical (or near-identical pricing), the CCI and the COMPAT
have held that such pricing in itself cannot be conclusive evidence of collusion.
However, collusion has been readily inferred where the different suppliers' costs
differ, and there are no plausible reasons for identical pricing.3" A distinction has
been drawn between cases of identical pricing with evidence of collusion and
cases of conscious parallelism where 'plus factors' are required.3' Evidence of
repeated identical pricing may be sufficient for a finding of collusion3 2, though
even here breach will be more readily inferred where there are supporting
factors.33

27 See LPG Cylinder Manufacturers at

8
'9
30

31

38.
32 Aluminium Phosphide Appeal at

3

14.12, Safdarjung Hospital at

6.2, Safdarjung Hospital

Appeal at 18, Aluminium Phosphide at 7.29, South Eastern Railways at 33, Rubber Soles at
26, Feed Valves at 33, and Bomb Containers at 34.
Bomb Containers at 34.
South Eastern Railway at 33, Rubber Soles at 26, Feed Valves at 33, and Bomb Containers at
34.
LPG Cylinder Manufacturers at 14.59.2-4, 14.60-14.63, LPG Cylinder Manufacturers Appeal
at 36, South Eastern Railway at 12-13, 16.17, Aluminium Phosphide at 7.21-7.23, Aluminium
Phosphide Appeal at 36, Rubber Soles at 27-32, Feed Valves at 31, 41-46, and Bomb
Containersat 35.
LPG Cylinder Manufacturers at 14.75, LPG Cylinder Manufacturers Appeal at 40, Aluminium
Phosphide at 7.33, South Eastern Railway at 39, Rubber Soles at 46, and Bomb Containers at

Feed Valves at 47, 48.

36.
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Supporting factors have included: contemporaneous meetings between bidders 34; the existence of a trade association giving competitors the opportunity to
interact and discuss trade issues 35; the appointment of common agents for depositing bids (and keeping a close watch on competitors) 3 6; the filling of bids by the
same person37; the same handwriting being used for different bids 38 ; bidders using
a similar format for covering letters 39; bidders visiting the contracting agency
together4°; and the sharing of confidential documents.4 ' The earning of "huge
margins" by bidders, and the quoting of rates far in excess of costs, has led to
an "irresistible inference" of collusion.4 2 The CCI has also seen industry conditions and market features as supporting factors. In the recent Bomb Containers
case 43, it adverted to "peculiar market conditions", such as few enterprises with
44
the same owners, stringently standardized product and predictable demand.
B. Market Allocation
In relation to market allocation, the CCI has held that an intention to divide up
supply was corroborated by the fact that the total quantity offered was very near
to the quantity stated in the tender. 45 It has also held that, where the parties have
restricted the quantity to be supplied, the fact that they have capacity well in
excess of this could, absent any valid explanation, only be the result of collusive
action for market allocation. 46 In Vaccines 47, the CCI concluded that the ineligibility of a third competitor to bid resulted in the other two competitors agreeing to
divide tendered quantities at substantially higher prices than previously: in reaching this conclusion, the CCI found that each was able to supply the full demand
on its own, and that the price increases were neither in line with inflation nor
48
justified by increased costs in production.

34 LPG Cylinder Manufacturers at

40
41
4'

14.16-14.22.5, 14.23-14.25, 14.68-14.69, and LPG Cylinder
ManufacturersAppeal at 20, 27.
LPG Cylinder ManufacturersAppeal at 26, Rubber Soles at 33.
LPG Cylinder Manufacturers at 14.26-14.27, 14.71 and LPG Cylinder Manufacturers Appeal at
22.
South Eastern Railway at 15.
Id at 17, 18.
Id at 20, 21, 34.
Aluminium Phosphide at 7.24-7.28.
Rubber Soles at 34.
Aluminium Phosphide at 7.44, 7.45.

43

Bomb Containers.

44

Id at 38.

35
36
37
3
39

45 South Eastern Railway at 18, 40.
46 Rubber Soles at 36, 41.

4

Vaccines

4

Id at

67.
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C. Cover Bidding
In establishing cover bidding, the CCI has referred to factors including: huge
differences between bid rates49 ; bids containing common typographical and other
errors5 0 ; bids containing identical technical deficiencies 5 ; failure to submit the
documents required or to accept required warranty clauses 52 ; mismatching dates
given in bid and supporting documents53 ; the making of simultaneous (or near-simultaneous) visits to the offices of the contracting authority 54 ; and the preparation
of separate price bids by the successful bidder with submission depending on the
55
participation/non-participation of other bidders.
The COMPAT has held that putting in technically deficient bids could not
result in cover bidding where there were other qualified bidders.5 6 It has also
found as "irrelevant and illogical" a CCI finding that parties submitting
bids at
57
the same time showed some kind of understanding between them.
In the very recent case involving Public Sector Insurance Companies58 , the
CCI considered a series of tenders involving public and private sector insurance
companies for implementing health insurance schemes. This was a rare case of
a 'smoking gun', since, in relation to a 2009 tender, the public sector companies
admitted in that they had in expressly agreed in a meeting of a coordination committee to share the business, with one of their number being the lead bidder. The
CCI found that the 2009 agreement was implemented, since the companies had
quoted on the basis of the decision taken in the meeting and they had admitted
to entering into a business sharing arrangement after finalization of the tender.
For tenders in later years, the CCI found that the successful bidder had forced
termination of the contract by demanding an increase in premiums, with the public sector companies quoting significantly higher rates in subsequent tenders. The
CCI found that the companies had again entered into business sharing arrangements, and stated that they had failed to provide any plausible justification for the
significant rises in premium rates. Relying on internal documents from two of
the companies showing the holding of meetings between the companies, the past
practice in relation to the 2009 tender, and the bidding pattern over the two later
tenders, the CCI concluded that the companies had agreed to manipulate the tendering process. Based on statements made by a successful private sector bidder,
'9 Safdarjung Hospital at 6.48 and Safdarjung Hospital Appeal at 12.
51 Safdarjung Hospital at 6.28-6.47 and Safdarjung Hospital Appeal at 11.
51 Jai Prakash Narain at 6.5.
52 Feed Valves at 35-37.
51 Safdarjung Hospital at 6.55-6.56. This was partly rejected by the COMPAT in Safdarjung
HospitalAppeal at 14.
54 Vaccines at 67.
55

Id.

56

Jai Prakash Narain Appeal at

19, referring to Jai Prakash Narain at
Id.
51 Public Sector Insurance Companies at 27-60.
57

6.10.
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who had succeeded in a subsequent tender, the CCI rejected arguments that the
public sector companies were incurring losses: instead, the CCI saw the forcing
of retendering and higher quotations in collusion as a "virtual fraud" forced on
the contracting authority.
D. Collective Boycotts
In relation to collective boycotts, the CCI found in Explosives 59 that bidders had acted collectively, rather than independently, in boycotting an auction
where two suppliers had written identical letters explaining their non-participation, and bidders later participated in a similar auction.60 The COMPAT held
that such parallel behaviour could not be coincidental given widespread opposition to the premature termination of existing contracts and to the holding of the
auction in question, the manner in which the suppliers acted in relation to the
auction, the letters from the suppliers, and actions taken by the suppliers' rep62
resentative body.6' In Aluminium Phosphide
, the CCI held that the very fact of
non-participation in a procurement procedure suggested a meeting of minds.63
The COMPAT, linking this boycott to identical pricing, held that such pricing
and such boycott "viewed on the backdrop of consistentpractice of offering only
identical bids" confirmed that it was made with a common design.64
VI. INDUSTRY FEATURES TENDING TO COLLUSION
The CCI in LPG Cylinder Manufacturersheld that bid rigging was more likely
to occur where particular features of the industry or of the product tended to collusion.6 5 Such features were market conditions, the small number of suppliers,
few new entrants, active trade associations, repetitive bidding, identical/similar
products, few or no substitutes, and no significant technological changes. The
COMPAT supported some of these findings on appeal.66
The CCI has again referred to general industry features in a couple of recent
cases. In Vaccines", "peculiar market conditions" making the market conducive
to collusion were the presence of only three suppliers, the homogeneous nature
of the product, fixed demand in the market, and the fact that the suppliers were

59

Explosives.

60

Id at 8.27-8.32.
Explosives Appeal at 43-48.
Aluminium Phosphide.
Id at 7.36-7.39.
Aluminium Phosphide Appeal at 36.
LPG Cylinder Manufacturers at 14.14, 14.15, where the CCI endorsed the approach taken by its

61
62
63
64
65

DG.
66
6

LPG Cylinder ManufacturersAppeal at 21, 26, 31.
Vaccines.
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repetitive bidders. 68 In Bomb Containers69, it held that a number of typical market
conditions strongly indicated that the market was very conducive to competition:
the small number of manufacturers, their geographical proximity, the absence of
new entrants, predictable and stable demand, stringently standardized product,
and the non-availability of substitutes. 70 It also considered that the cross-ownership of few market players unequivocally pointed towards concerted action in the
bidding process, with the "modus operandi" of at least ten out of thirteen firms
7
concerned "governed by the principles of mutual understandingand benefit". '
VII. CONCLUSION
In the space of under four years, the CCI has made orders establishing bid
rigging in eleven cases. On appeal, the COMPAT in all but one case 72 largely
upheld the CCI's substantive findings. One of these cases is currently before the
COMPAT for the first time73 and another for the second time (on the issue of penalties). 74 The COMPAT's verdict remain to be seen. Although the verdict of the
Supreme Court is awaited in three of these cases, the number of cases addressed
by the CCI and COMPAT in this field is impressive. Their ability to establish
bid rigging has clearly been helped by the broad definition given to prohibited
conduct, by the presumption of an appreciable adverse effect on competition,
and (last but not least) the ability to rely on indirect or circumstantial evidence
to establish breach. These tools have been used to good advantage. The proof of
the pudding is in the eating and, when all is said and done, there is an impressive
body of practice in India.
However, one should be wary of circumstantial evidence. By its nature, it is
'circumstantial' and less reliable than indirect evidence. This is even more the
case where a civil standard of proof is being applied. It is important that the CCI
and, later on, the COMPAT are meticulous in the gathering and assessment of all
types of evidence, and do not jump to hasty conclusions.

68 Id at 67.
69 Bomb Containers.

Id at 36).
Id at 37).
72 Jai Prakash Narain Appeal.
7' Feed Valves Appeal.
' LPG Cylinder ManufacturersAppeal (No. 2).
0
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